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dc.contributor.authorHarstad, Bården
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-25-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:18:22Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:18:22Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38935-
dc.description.abstractIf a coalition of countries implements climate policies, nonparticipants tend to consume more, pollute more, and invest too little in renewable energy sources. In response, the coalition's equilibrium policy distorts trade and it is not time consistent. By adding a market for the right to exploit fossil fuel deposits, I show that these problems vanish and the first best is implemented. When the market for deposits clears, the coalition relies entirely on supply-side policies, which is simple to implement in practice. The result illustrates that efficiency can be obtained without Coasian negotiations ex post, if key inputs are tradable ex ante.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2992en
dc.subject.jelQ54en
dc.subject.jelQ58en
dc.subject.jelH23en
dc.subject.jelF55en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCoaseen
dc.subject.keywordclimate changeen
dc.subject.keywordcarbon leakageen
dc.subject.keywordsupply vs. demand side policiesen
dc.subject.keywordtrade policiesen
dc.subject.keywordthe green paradoxen
dc.subject.keywordenvironmental agreementsen
dc.subject.stwKlimaschutzen
dc.subject.stwInternationale Umweltpolitiken
dc.subject.stwIndustrieverlagerungen
dc.subject.stwFossiler Energieträgeren
dc.subject.stwErdölkonzessionen
dc.subject.stwEmissionshandelen
dc.subject.stwInternationale Handelspolitiken
dc.subject.stwZeitkonsistenzen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleBuy coal! Deposit markets prevent carbon leakage-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn622656392en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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