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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2992
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
If a coalition of countries implements climate policies, nonparticipants tend to consume more, pollute more, and invest too little in renewable energy sources. In response, the coalition's equilibrium policy distorts trade and it is not time consistent. By adding a market for the right to exploit fossil fuel deposits, I show that these problems vanish and the first best is implemented. When the market for deposits clears, the coalition relies entirely on supply-side policies, which is simple to implement in practice. The result illustrates that efficiency can be obtained without Coasian negotiations ex post, if key inputs are tradable ex ante.
Schlagwörter: 
Coase
climate change
carbon leakage
supply vs. demand side policies
trade policies
the green paradox
environmental agreements
JEL: 
Q54
Q58
H23
F55
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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