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dc.contributor.authorGrechenig, Kristoffelen
dc.contributor.authorSekyra, Michaelen
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-09-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:11:11Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:11:11Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38864-
dc.description.abstractWe address one of the cardinal puzzles of European corporate law: the lack of derivate share-holder suits. We explain this phenomenon on the basis of percentage limits which require share-holders to hold a minimum amount of shares in order to bring a lawsuit. We show that, under this legal regime, managers will collude with large shareholders by means of settlements or bribes that impose a negative externality on small shareholders. Contrary to conventional agency models, we find that large shareholders do not monitor the management; as a consequence, there is no free riding opportunity for small shareholders.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,15en
dc.subject.jelK22en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.jelG30en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordDerivative Shareholder Suitsen
dc.subject.keywordPercentage Limitsen
dc.subject.keywordCollusionen
dc.subject.keywordMonitoringen
dc.subject.keywordFree Ridingen
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen
dc.subject.stwAktionäreen
dc.subject.stwZivilprozessen
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen
dc.subject.stwMultinationales Unternehmenen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwEuropaen
dc.subject.stwUSAen
dc.titleNo derivative shareholder suits in Europe: A model of percentage limits and collusion-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn627560288en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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