Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38722 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionspapier No. 95
Publisher: 
Helmut-Schmidt-Universität - Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre, Hamburg
Abstract: 
Post-docs signal their ability to do science and teaching to get a tenure giving universities the possibility of separating highly talented agents from the low talented ones. However separating that means signalling effort for the highly talented becomes even more important in a two-dimensional signalling case. This attracts notice to time constraints. Under weak conditions separating equilibria do not exist if time constraints are binding. The existing equilibria are more costly but without additional information compared to the onedimensional case. Considering this, the efficiency of the current two-dimensional academic job market signalling can be improved by switching to a one-dimensional one.
Subjects: 
Multi-dimensional signalling
Academic job market
Teaching and Research
JEL: 
I23
D82
J41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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