Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38721 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Diskussionspapier No. 86
Verlag: 
Helmut-Schmidt-Universität - Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre, Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
This contribution provides a game theoretical derivation of market demand as a function of the level and distribution of income in the considered economy: if (i) the price is low, everyone buys the good; if (ii ) the price is high, only the rich buy the good (a status good in a narrow sense). If (iii) the price is located in very high or in middle range, demand collapses. With this, we explain the critical price from which a status good acts as a distinctive signal. In addition, this approach shows the potential welfare-improving impact of conspicuous consumption. Taking these results into account, recommendations by numerous economists to prevent the welfare losses of conspicuous consumption by introducing a luxury tax are highly questionable.
Schlagwörter: 
luxury tax
conspicuous consumption
mating model
signaling game
status good
JEL: 
C70
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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