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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38718
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Horgos, Daniel | en |
dc.contributor.author | Zimmermann, Klaus W. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-09-22 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-13T12:18:45Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-08-13T12:18:45Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.pi | urn:nbn:de:gbv:705-opus-20930 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38718 | - |
dc.description.abstract | With interest groups significantly affecting economic performance (according to Mancur Olson) and a vital interest of governments in economic growth and low unemployment in order to win elections, there should be a link between political business cycles and the evolution of lobbies over time which has totally been ignored in the literature up to now. In modeling this link in a theoretical and empirical way we try to answer two questions: Is it possible to interpret Olson's Law of Interest Groups not only as a long run phenomenon but also in a short-run perspective, integrating it into the theory of political business cycles? And: is there any empirical evidence that a typical pattern of lobby behavior and macroeconomic status exists which is consistent over a couple of election periods? In order to investigate these issues, we first analyze some literature that is usually ignored in the more technical contributions evaluating Olson´s law, but proves to be highly important as background for answering the above mentioned questions. We then illustrate how a model consisting of Olson´s interest-groups theory and the endeavors of governments to win the majority of votes in elections could look like, before we perform a time-series-analysis based on the lobby-list of the German Bundestag in order to gain some more insights into the relationships between lobbies, governments and voters. As a result we discover a consistent behavior of the lobbies over the cycle that boils down to some kind of non-aggression pact between the lobbies and the governments irrespective of their political alignments. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aHelmut-Schmidt-Universität - Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre |cHamburg | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDiskussionspapier |x98 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D78 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | interest groups | en |
dc.subject.keyword | political business cycles | en |
dc.subject.keyword | growth | en |
dc.subject.keyword | unemployment | en |
dc.subject.keyword | inflation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Interessenvertretung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Interessenpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wirkungsanalyse | en |
dc.subject.stw | Politischer Konjunkturzyklus | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wirtschaftswachstum | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitslosigkeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Inflation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Deutschland | en |
dc.title | It takes two to Tango: Lobbies and the political business cycle | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 608266264 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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