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dc.contributor.authorHorgos, Danielen
dc.contributor.authorZimmermann, Klaus W.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-22-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-13T12:18:45Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-13T12:18:45Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:gbv:705-opus-20930en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38718-
dc.description.abstractWith interest groups significantly affecting economic performance (according to Mancur Olson) and a vital interest of governments in economic growth and low unemployment in order to win elections, there should be a link between political business cycles and the evolution of lobbies over time which has totally been ignored in the literature up to now. In modeling this link in a theoretical and empirical way we try to answer two questions: Is it possible to interpret Olson's Law of Interest Groups not only as a long run phenomenon but also in a short-run perspective, integrating it into the theory of political business cycles? And: is there any empirical evidence that a typical pattern of lobby behavior and macroeconomic status exists which is consistent over a couple of election periods? In order to investigate these issues, we first analyze some literature that is usually ignored in the more technical contributions evaluating Olson´s law, but proves to be highly important as background for answering the above mentioned questions. We then illustrate how a model consisting of Olson´s interest-groups theory and the endeavors of governments to win the majority of votes in elections could look like, before we perform a time-series-analysis based on the lobby-list of the German Bundestag in order to gain some more insights into the relationships between lobbies, governments and voters. As a result we discover a consistent behavior of the lobbies over the cycle that boils down to some kind of non-aggression pact between the lobbies and the governments irrespective of their political alignments.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHelmut-Schmidt-Universität - Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre |cHamburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionspapier |x98en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordinterest groupsen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical business cyclesen
dc.subject.keywordgrowthen
dc.subject.keywordunemploymenten
dc.subject.keywordinflationen
dc.subject.stwInteressenvertretungen
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken
dc.subject.stwWirkungsanalyseen
dc.subject.stwPolitischer Konjunkturzyklusen
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftswachstumen
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosigkeiten
dc.subject.stwInflationen
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden
dc.titleIt takes two to Tango: Lobbies and the political business cycle-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn608266264en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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