Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38651 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CSIO Working Paper No. 0088
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO), Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper considers three firms that engage in an R&D contest to develop a new profitable technology. For a broad range of parameters, the firm that leads the contest (i.e., has the highest probability of success) is better-off licensing or selling its superior interim knowledge to one of the two lagging firms or to both rather than holding on to its lead. Although transferring interim R&D knowledge to the lagging firms erodes the technological lead of the leading firm, it allows it to extract rents from its rivals and can possibly create value by increasing the chance that the licensee(s) will develop the new technology when the leading firm fails.
Schlagwörter: 
Interim R&D knowledge
exclusive and nonexclusive licensing
transfer of knowledge
cross-licensing
JEL: 
D45
O32
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
292.57 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.