Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37514
Authors: 
Kölle, Felix
Sliwka, Dirk
Zhou, Nannan
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Formation and Performance of Teams F12-V2
Abstract: 
We investigate the effects of wealth inequality on the incentives to contribute to a public good or a team output when agents are inequity averse. We show that inequality may increase total output when it favors the more able agents. Moreover, the more inequity averse the agents, the larger should be the inequality in wealth if total output is to be maximized.
Subjects: 
Public good
team incentives
inequity aversion
inequality
wage setting
JEL: 
M50
M52
D31
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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