Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37457 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Environmental Policy: Incentives and Instruments No. F18-V2
Verlag: 
Verein für Socialpolitik, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
Emission allowances are often distributed for free in an early phase of a cap-and-trade scheme (grandfathering) to reduce adverse effects on the profitability of firms. If the grandfathering scheme is phased out over time, firms may nevertheless relocate to countries with a lower carbon price once the competitive disadvantage of their home industry becomes sufficiently high. We show that this is not necessarily the case. A temporary grandfathering policy can be a sufficient instrument to avert relocation in the long run, even if immediate relocation would be profitable in the absence of grandfathering. A necessary condition for this is that the permit price triggers investments in low-carbon technologies or abatement capital.
Schlagwörter: 
climate policy
emissions trading
grandfathering
leakage
cap-and-trade
JEL: 
Q55
Q58
L51
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

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