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dc.contributor.authorBetz, Reginaen
dc.contributor.authorCalford, Evan M.en
dc.contributor.authorHeinzel, Christophen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T08:53:05Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T08:53:05Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37424-
dc.description.abstractWe analyse the efficiency effects of the initial permit allocation given to firms with market power in both permit and output market. We examine two models: a long-run model with endogenous technology and capacity choice, and a short-run model with fixed technology and capacity. In the long run, quantity pre-commitment with Bertrand competition can yield Cournot outcomes also under emissions trading. In the short run, Bertrand output competition reproduces the effects derived under Cournot competition, but displays higher pass-through profits. In a second-best setting of overallocation, a tighter emissions target tends to improve permit-market efficiency in the short run.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Regulating Related Industries |xE9-V3en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.jelQ28en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordemissions tradingen
dc.subject.keywordinitial permit allocationen
dc.subject.keywordBertrand competitionen
dc.subject.keywordEU ETSen
dc.subject.keywordendogenous technology choiceen
dc.subject.keywordKreps and Scheinkmanen
dc.titleInitial Allocation Effects in Permit Markets with Bertrand Output Oligopoly-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn655983341en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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