Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37262 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Social Preferences No. E13-V3
Publisher: 
Verein für Socialpolitik, Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
This paper investigates how group membership and competition among trustors interact with trust and trustworthiness in a laboratory one-shot trust game. To analyze these effects, we apply a 2x2 design. We induce group membership by letting subjects play coordination games with clear focal points, leading to higher investments and trustworthiness. Introducing competition leads to a decrease in trustworthiness, especially among partners. We argue that once competition comes into play, trustees perceive trustors'investments as the outcomes of a competitive bidding process rather than good intentions, which reduces reciprocity.
Subjects: 
trust
reciprocity
investment game
group membership
competition
JEL: 
C92
L14
Z13
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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