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dc.contributor.authorKlepper, Gernoten
dc.contributor.authorPeterson, Sonjaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T14:14:24Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T14:14:24Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.citation|aEnvironmental & resource economics|c0924-6460|v32|h2|nSpringer|lDordrecht|y2005|p205-227en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/3718-
dc.description.abstractAfter the conferences in Bonn and Marrakech it is likely that international emissions trading will be realized in the near future. Major influences on the permit market are the institutional detail, the participation structure and the treatment of hot-air. Different scenarios do not only differ in their implications for the demand and supply of permits and thus the permit price, but also in their allocative effects. In this paper we discuss likely institutional designs for permit allocation in the hot-air economies and the use of market power and quantify the resulting effects by using the computable general equilibrium model DART. It turns out that the amount of hot-air supplied will be small if hot-air economies cooperate in their decisions. Under welfare maximization more hot-air is supplied than in the case were governments try to maximize revenues from permit sales.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aSpringer |cDordrechten
dc.subject.jelQ48en
dc.subject.jelF18en
dc.subject.jelD58en
dc.subject.jelC68en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCGE Modelen
dc.subject.keywordDARTen
dc.subject.keywordEmission Tradingen
dc.subject.keywordHot-Airen
dc.subject.keywordKyoto Protocolen
dc.subject.keywordMarket Poweren
dc.subject.keywordPermit Allocationen
dc.subject.stwEmissionsrechteen
dc.subject.stwKlimaschutzen
dc.subject.stwUmweltabkommenen
dc.subject.stwAllgemeines Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyseen
dc.titleTrading hot-air: the influence of permit allocation rules, market power and the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol-
dc.typeArticleen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwkie:3718en
dc.identifier.printppn50135851Xen
dc.date.issuedonline2009en
dc.publisher.online|aZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |cKiel, Hamburgen
econstor.documentversionAccepted Manuscript (Postprint)en
econstor.citation.journaltitleEnvironmental & resource economicsen
econstor.citation.issn0924-6460en
econstor.citation.volume32en
econstor.citation.issue2en
econstor.citation.publisherSpringeren
econstor.citation.publisherplaceDordrechten
econstor.citation.year2005en
econstor.citation.startpage205en
econstor.citation.endpage227en

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