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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Economic Aspects of Health No. B18-V4
Verlag: 
Verein für Socialpolitik, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
Economic theory stresses the importance of adverse selection in competitive insurance markets. The empirical evidence for adverse selection in different health-related insurance markets, however, is mixed. This study evaluates whether different degrees of private information left after different underwriting processes could explain these findings. The analysis uses data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, one of the rare longitudinal data sets with objectively measured health information. Using self-rated health as a proxy for private information this study finds that thorough underwriting eliminates private information on health risks and thus the scope for adverse selection in life and health insurance.
Schlagwörter: 
ELSA
self-rated health
adverse selection
objective health measures
JEL: 
I10
D82
C33
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

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