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dc.contributor.authorAnia, Ana B.en
dc.contributor.authorWagener, Andreasen
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-17-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-03T13:10:43Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-03T13:10:43Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37120-
dc.description.abstractWe interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule 'imitate the best.' In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aLeibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |cHannoveren
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionsbeitrag |x416en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.jelH75en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordOpen Method of Coordinationen
dc.subject.keywordFinite-population Evolutionarily Stable Strategyen
dc.subject.keywordImitationen
dc.subject.keywordMobilityen
dc.subject.keywordRedistributionen
dc.subject.stwEU-Politiken
dc.subject.stwInternationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordinationen
dc.subject.stwEvolutionäre Spieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen
dc.titleThe open method of coordination (OMC) as an evolutionary learning process-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn601899946en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:han:dpaper:dp-416en

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