Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37120 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Diskussionsbeitrag No. 416
Verlag: 
Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Hannover
Zusammenfassung: 
We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule 'imitate the best.' In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.
Schlagwörter: 
Open Method of Coordination
Finite-population Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
Imitation
Mobility
Redistribution
JEL: 
H77
H75
C73
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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