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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 5027
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal contracts may entail properties such as inducing first-best effort and surplus, or non-responsiveness with respect to changes in verifiable parameters. Moreover, while always socially inefficient, separation might occur in equilibrium. Except for the latter, these findings are robust to renegotiation. When the outside option is exogenous instead, the standard results obtain.
Schlagwörter: 
Moral hazard
limited commitment
ex-post outside option
limited liability
JEL: 
D86
D82
K31
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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