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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 4827
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine the influence of guilt and trust on the performance of credence goods markets. An expert can make a promise to a consumer first, whereupon the consumer can express her trust by paying an interaction price before the expert's provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert's promise induces a commitment that triggers guilt if the promise is broken, and guilt is exacerbated by higher interaction prices. An experiment qualitatively confirms our predictions: (1) most experts make the predicted promise; (2) proper promises induce consumer-friendly behavior; and (3) higher interaction prices increase the commitment value of proper promises.
Schlagwörter: 
Promises
guilt
trust
credence goods
experts
reciprocity
JEL: 
C72
C91
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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