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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 4863
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
The career prospects of newly recruited employees differ substantially within an organization. The stars experience a considerable growth in earnings; others can hardly maintain their entry salaries. This article sheds light on the mechanisms generating the observed heterogeneity in earnings progression by investigating the effects of on-the-job human capital acquisition, explicit short-run incentives and career concern incentives on earnings progression. The model leads to predictions about the incentive structure and the progression in both cross-sectional and individual earnings which are supported by the empirical analysis based on personnel records from a large bank.
Schlagwörter: 
Explicit incentives
career concern incentives
performance
earnings dynamics
personnel economics
JEL: 
J30
J41
M50
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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