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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 4732
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We present an experiment on strategic thinking and behavior of individuals and teams in one-shot normal-form games. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often consistent by being a best reply to first order beliefs. We identify the complexity of a game and the payoffs in equilibrium as determining the likelihood of consistent behavior according to textbook rationality. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals.
Schlagwörter: 
Strategic sophistication
beliefs
experiment
team decision making
individual decision making
JEL: 
C72
C91
C92
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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