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dc.contributor.authorChamon, Marcosen
dc.contributor.authorde Mello, João M. P.en
dc.contributor.authorFirpo, Sergioen
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-16-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T12:06:11Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T12:06:11Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/36118-
dc.description.abstractWe exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a runoff election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. We show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. We use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current expenditures, particularly personnel expenditures. The impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x4658en
dc.subject.jelH72en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelC14en
dc.subject.jelP1en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordElectoral systemsen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical competitionen
dc.subject.keywordregression discontinuityen
dc.subject.keywordfiscal expendituresen
dc.subject.stwKommunale Finanzpolitiken
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwKommunalwahlen
dc.subject.stwWahlsystemen
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwBrasilienen
dc.titleElectoral rules, political competition and fiscal expenditures: regression discontinuity evidence from Brazilian municipalities-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn618690875en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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