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dc.contributor.authorFehr, Ernsten
dc.contributor.authorZehnder, Christianen
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-04-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T12:03:36Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T12:03:36Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2009092293en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35871-
dc.description.abstractThe evidence suggests that relational contracting and legal rules play an important role in credit markets but on the basis of the prevailing field data it is difficult to pin down their causal impact. Here we show experimentally that relational incentives are a powerful causal determinant for the existence and performance of credit markets. In fact, in the absence of legal enforcement and reputation formation opportunities the credit market breaks down almost completely while if reputation formation is possible a stable credit market emerges even in the absence of legal enforcement of debt repayment. Introducing legal enforcement of repayments causes a further significant increase in credit market trading but has only a surprisingly small impact on overall efficiency. The reason is that legal enforcement of debt repayments weakens relational incentives and exacerbates another moral hazard problem in credit markets the choice of inefficient high-risk projects.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x4351en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.jelG28en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCredit marketsen
dc.subject.keywordrelationship lendingen
dc.subject.keywordreputation formationen
dc.subject.keywordlegal enforcementen
dc.subject.stwKreditmarkten
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen
dc.subject.stwPrestigeen
dc.subject.stwSchuldrechten
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleReputation and credit market formation: how relational incentives and legal contract enforcement interact-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn610223453en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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