Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35611 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 3862
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We model the sorting of medical students across medical occupations and identify a mechanism that explains the possibility of differential productivity across occupations. The model combines moral hazard and matching of physicians and occupations with pre-matching investments. In equilibrium assortative matching takes place; more able physicians join occupations less exposed to moral hazard risk, face more powerful performance incentives, and are more productive. Under-consumption of health services relative to the first best allocation increases with occupational (moral hazard) risk. Occupations with risk above a given threshold are not viable. The model offers an explanation for the persistence of distortions in the mix of health care services offered, the differential impact of malpractice risk across occupations, and the recent growth in medical specialization.
Schlagwörter: 
Performance measurement
moral hazard
incentives
matching
pre-matching investment
career choice
medical specialization
JEL: 
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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