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dc.contributor.authorLehmann, Etienneen
dc.contributor.authorParmentier, Alexisen
dc.contributor.authorvan der Linden, Brunoen
dc.date.accessioned2008-11-11-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:52:33Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:52:33Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20081126795en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35495-
dc.description.abstractThis paper characterizes the optimal redistributive taxation when individuals are heterogeneous in two exogenous dimensions: their skills and their values of non-market activities. Search-matching frictions on the labor markets create unemployment. Wages, labor demand and participation are endogenous. The government only observes wage levels. Under a Maximin objective, if the elasticity of participation decreases along the distribution of skills, at the optimum, the average tax rate is increasing, marginal tax rates are positive everywhere, while wages, unemployment rates and participation rates are distorted downwards compared to their laissez-faire values. A simulation exercise confirms some of these properties under a general utilitarian objective. Taking account of the wage-cum-labor demand margin deeply changes the equity-efficiency trade-off.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3804en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordNon-linear taxationen
dc.subject.keywordredistributionen
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen
dc.subject.keywordrandom participationen
dc.subject.keywordunemploymenten
dc.subject.keywordlabor market frictionsen
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren
dc.subject.stwSteuerprogressionen
dc.subject.stwFriktionelle Arbeitslosigkeiten
dc.subject.stwArbeitsangeboten
dc.subject.stwLohnniveauen
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarkttheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOptimal income taxation with endogenous participation and search unemployment-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn584695683en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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