Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35480
Authors: 
Boeri, Tito
Severgnini, Battista
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
IZA discussion papers 3745
Abstract: 
This paper contributes to the literature on competition and corruption, by drawing on records from Calciopoli, a judicial inquiry carried out in 2006 on corruption in the Italian soccer league. Unlike previous studies, we can estimate the determinants of match rigging and use this information in identifying corruption episodes in years in which there are no pending judicial inquiries. We find evidence of corruption activity well before Calciopoli. Career concerns of referees seem to play a major role in match rigging. An implication of our study is that a more transparent selection of the referees and evaluation of their performance is essential in removing incentives to match rigging. Another implication is that in presence of significant winners-take-all effects, more competitive balance may increase corruption unless media concentration is also significantly reduced.
Subjects: 
Concentration
corruption
career concerns
random effect ordered probit
Monte Carlo simulations
soccer
JEL: 
D73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
457.03 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.