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dc.contributor.authorBallester, Coralioen
dc.contributor.authorCalvó-Armengol, Antonien
dc.contributor.authorZenou, Yvesen
dc.date.accessioned2009-05-06-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:51:40Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:51:40Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20090513194en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35421-
dc.description.abstractDelinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among delinquents are modeled by means of a graph where delinquents compete for a booty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbors. Each delinquent decides in a non-cooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. Using the network model developed by Ballester et al. (2006), we characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy, which targets the delinquent who, once removed, leads to the highest aggregate delinquency reduction. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal for delinquency reduction, the key player, to optimal group removal, the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex since it depends on wages and on the structure of the network.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x4122en
dc.subject.jelA14en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSocial networksen
dc.subject.keyworddelinquency decisionen
dc.subject.keywordkey groupen
dc.subject.keywordNP-hard problemen
dc.subject.keywordcrime policiesen
dc.subject.stwKriminalitäten
dc.subject.stwSoziales Netzwerken
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwKriminalitätsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwKriminalpolitiken
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDelinquent networks-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn599234903en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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