Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/34967
Authors: 
Kaas, Leo
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
IZA discussion papers 3697
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes an urn-ball matching model in which workers decide how intensively they sample job openings and apply at a stochastic number of suitable vacancies. Equilibrium is not constrained efficient; entry is excessive and search intensity can be too high or too low. Moreover, an inefficient discouraged-worker effect among homogenous workers emerges under adverse labor market conditions. Unlike existing coordination-friction economies with fixed search intensity, the model can account for the empirical relation between the job-finding rate and the vacancy-unemployment ratio, provided that search costs are small and that search intensity is sufficiently procyclical.
Subjects: 
Matching function
coordination frictions
unemployment
JEL: 
E24
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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