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dc.contributor.authorGagliarducci, Stefanoen
dc.contributor.authorNannicini, Tommasoen
dc.contributor.authorNaticchioni, Paoloen
dc.date.accessioned2008-08-26-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:29:48Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:29:48Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/34826-
dc.description.abstractTheory predicts that the majoritarian electoral system should produce more targeted redistribution and lower politicians' rents than proportional representation. We test these predictions using micro data for the mixed-member Italian House of Representatives, which allow us to sidestep the identification problems of previous studies based on country-level data. In particular, we address the nonrandom selection into different electoral systems by exploiting a distinctive feature of the Italian two-tier elections from 1994 to 2006: candidates could run for both the majoritarian and the proportional tier, but if they won in both tiers they had to accept the majoritarian seat. Focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows us to generate quasi-experimental estimates of the impact of the electoral rule. The main results confirm theoretical predictions, as majoritarian representatives put forward a higher proportion of bills targeted at local areas and show lower absenteeism rates than their proportional colleagues.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3348en
dc.subject.jelC20en
dc.subject.ddc320en
dc.subject.keywordElectoral ruleen
dc.subject.keywordpoliticiansen
dc.subject.keywordtargeted redistributionen
dc.subject.keywordrent-seekingen
dc.subject.keywordregression discontinuity designen
dc.subject.keywordtreatment effecten
dc.subject.stwPolitikeren
dc.subject.stwVerhaltenen
dc.subject.stwWahlsystemen
dc.subject.stwRegionalpolitiken
dc.subject.stwWahlkreisen
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen
dc.subject.stwItalienen
dc.titleElectoral rules and politicians' behavior: a micro test-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn559866968en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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