Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33673
Authors: 
Addison, John T.
Barrett, Charles Richard
Siebert, William Stanley
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 1866
Abstract: 
The paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investigate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers' insurance, and may also redistribute in favour of more deserving workers. The risk is that it may also reduce output. The more diverse are free market contracts
Subjects: 
separating the various worker types
JEL: 
D82
J33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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