Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/33649 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 1762
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
The labor economics literature has shown that the efficient bargaining model, in which wage and employment are negotiated simultaneously, is less frequently used on unionized markets than the less efficient right-to-manage model, in which wage is determined via bargaining and employment determined subsequently and unilaterally by the firm. This paper reports an experiment in which the choice of the bargaining agenda is endogenous within a noncooperative game. We find that participants show a preference for decision authority and choose single-issue bargaining in most cases even though efficiency is lower than in multiissue bargaining. Furthermore, multi-issue bargaining induces unions to offer smaller payoff shares and leads to a higher conflict rate than in a single-issue bargaining.
Schlagwörter: 
bargaining agenda
efficient contracts
right-to-manage
decision authority
experiments
JEL: 
C72
C78
C91
J51
J53
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
283.66 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.