Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/33517 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 1687
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We characterize the equilibrium of a search model with a continuum of job and worker types, wage bargaining, free entry of vacancies and on-the-job search. The decentralized economy with monopsonistic wage setting yields too many vacancies and hence too low unemployment compared to first best. This is due to a business-stealing externality. Raising workers' bargaining power resolves this inefficiency. Unemployment benefits are a second best alternative to this policy. We establish simple relations between the losses in production due to search frictions and wage differentials on the one hand and unemployment on the other hand. Both can be used for empirical testing.
Schlagwörter: 
assignment
on-the-job search
search frictions
efficiency
optimal UI benefits
JEL: 
J3
J6
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
455.6 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.