Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33514
Authors: 
Campos, Nauro F.
Giovannoni, Francesco
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 1867
Abstract: 
During the transition from plan to market, managers and politicians succeeded in maintaining control of large parts of the stock of socialist physical capital. Despite the obvious importance of this phenomenon, there have been no efforts to model, measure and investigate this process empirically. This paper tries to fill this gap by putting forward theory and econometric evidence. We argue that asset stripping is driven by the interplay between the firm's potential profitability and its ability to influence law enforcement. Our econometric results, for about 950 firms in five transition economies, provide support for this argument.
Subjects: 
asset stripping
law enforcement
corruption
transition
JEL: 
H82
K42
O17
P26
P31
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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