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dc.contributor.authorBandiera, Orianaen
dc.contributor.authorBarankay, Iwanen
dc.contributor.authorRasul, Imranen
dc.date.accessioned2006-10-12-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:11:33Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:11:33Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33403-
dc.description.abstractWe present evidence from a firm level experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial compensation from fixed wages to performance pay based on the average productivity of lower-tier workers. Theory suggests that managerial incentives affect both the mean and dispersion of workers' productivity through two channels. First, managers respond to incentives by targeting their efforts towards more able workers, implying that both the mean and the dispersion increase. Second, managers select out the least able workers, implying that the mean increases but the dispersion may decrease. In our field experiment we find that the introduction of managerial performance pay raises both the mean and dispersion of worker productivity. Analysis of individual level productivity data shows that managers target their effort towards high ability workers, and the least able workers are less likely to be selected into employment. These results highlight the interplay between the provision of managerial incentives and earnings inequality among lower-tier workers.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x2062en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordmanagerial incentivesen
dc.subject.keywordtargetingen
dc.subject.keywordselectionen
dc.subject.keywordearnings inequalityen
dc.subject.stwVergütungssystemen
dc.subject.stwManagementen
dc.subject.stwErfolgsbeteiligungen
dc.subject.stwUngelernte Arbeitskräfteen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsproduktivitäten
dc.subject.stwLohndifferenzierungen
dc.subject.stwGroßbritannienen
dc.titleIncentives for managers and inequality among workers: evidence from a firm level experiment-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn510380387en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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