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dc.contributor.authorKoch, Alexander K.en
dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theoen
dc.date.accessioned2005-11-18-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:09:25Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:09:25Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33257-
dc.description.abstractRecent bargaining experiments demonstrated an impact of anonymity and incomplete information on subjects' behavior. This has rekindled the question whether fair behavior is inspired by regard for others or is explained by external forces. To test for the importance of external pressure we compare a standard double blind dictator game to a treatment which provides no information about the source of dictator offers, and where recipients do not even know that they participate in an experiment. We find no differences between treatments. This suggests that those dictators who give are purely internally motivated, as asserted by models of other-regarding preferences.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1703en
dc.subject.jelA13en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelD64en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworddictator gameen
dc.subject.keywordaltruismen
dc.subject.keywordsocial preferencesen
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleGiving in dictator games: regard for others or regard by others?-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn496430904en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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