Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32669 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorJoosten, Reinouden
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-26-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-20T14:40:11Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-20T14:40:11Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32669-
dc.description.abstractWe present two new notions of evolutionary stability, the truly evolutionarily stable state (TESS) and the generalized evolutionarily stable equilibrium (GESE). The GESE generalizes the evolutionarily stable equilibrium (ESE) of Joosten [1996]. An ESE attracts all nearby trajectories monotonically, i.e., the Euclidean distance decreasing steadily in time. For a GESE this property should holds for at least one metric. The TESS generalizes the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of Maynard Smith & Price [1973]. A TESS attracts nearby trajectories too, but the behavior of the dynamics nearby must be similar to the behavior of the replicator dynamics near an ESS. Both notions are defned on the dynamics and immediately imply asymptotical stability for the dynamics at hand, i.e., the equilibrium attracts all trajectories sufficiently nearby. We consider this the relevant and conceptually right approach in defining evolutionary equilibria, rather than defining a static equilibrium notion and search for appropriate dynamics guaranteeing its dynamic stability. Moreover, the GESE and the TESS take similar positions as the ESE and ESE do in relation to other equilibrium and fixed point concepts in general.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPapers on Economics and Evolution |x0916en
dc.subject.jelA12en
dc.subject.jelC62en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordevolutionary stabilityen
dc.subject.keywordevolutionary game theoryen
dc.titlePaul Samuelson's critique and equilibrium concepts in evolutionary game theory-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn617152489en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
294.42 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.