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dc.contributor.authorPloner, Matteoen
dc.contributor.authorSchmelz, Katrinen
dc.contributor.authorZiegelmeyer, Anthonyen
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-20T14:34:36Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-20T14:34:36Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32633-
dc.description.abstractWe report three repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) C5 and C10 treatments whose results largely conflict with those of the original study. We mainly observe hidden costs of control of low magnitude which lead to low-trust principal-agent relationships. We also report an extension where performance-based rewards are absent i.e. both principals and agents are paid according to a at participation fee. Our extension largely reproduces the striking findings of the original study. In particular, we observe that hidden costs outweigh benefits of control.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2010,007en
dc.subject.jelC81en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordControlen
dc.subject.keywordExperimental Economicsen
dc.subject.keywordIncentivesen
dc.subject.keywordIntrinsic Motivationen
dc.subject.keywordTrusten
dc.subject.stwLeistungskontrolleen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen
dc.subject.stwMotivationen
dc.subject.stwVertrauenen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleHidden costs of control: Three repetitions and an extension-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn621700193en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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