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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2010,007
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
We report three repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) C5 and C10 treatments whose results largely conflict with those of the original study. We mainly observe hidden costs of control of low magnitude which lead to low-trust principal-agent relationships. We also report an extension where performance-based rewards are absent i.e. both principals and agents are paid according to a at participation fee. Our extension largely reproduces the striking findings of the original study. In particular, we observe that hidden costs outweigh benefits of control.
Schlagwörter: 
Control
Experimental Economics
Incentives
Intrinsic Motivation
Trust
JEL: 
C81
C91
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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