Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32610 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2009,069
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by outcomes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, where procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry the same information on other's intentions while they have different outcome-invariant properties. Agents are experimentally confirmed to exhibit preferences over these which link to psychological attributes of their moral judgment.
Schlagwörter: 
procedural preferences
experiment
procedural fairness
JEL: 
C78
D63
Z13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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