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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2009,36
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
I study the incentives of Cournot duopolists to share their technologies with their competitor in markets where intellectual property rights are absent and imitation is costless. The trade-off between a signaling effect and an expropriation effect determines the technology-sharing incentives. In equilibrium at most one firm shares some of its technologies. For similar technology distributions, there exists an equilibrium in which nobody shares. If the technology distributions are skewed towards efficient technologies, then there may exist equilibria in which one firm shares all technologies, only the best technologies, or only intermediate technologies. No other equilibria can exist.
Schlagwörter: 
Cournot duopoly
strategic disclosure
indivisibility
innovation
trade secret
open source
skewed distribution
JEL: 
D82
L13
L17
O32
O34
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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