Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32179
Authors: 
Schindler, Dirk
Schjelderup, Guttorm
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper series // Zentrum für Finanzen und Ökonometrie, Universität Konstanz 2006,01
Abstract: 
We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society's point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.
Subjects: 
Corporate tax systems
tacit collusion
JEL: 
H87
L1
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.