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dc.contributor.authorLambsdorff, Johannen
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-07-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:54:54Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:54:54Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32018-
dc.description.abstractThe objectives of government are pivotal to understanding the diverse negative effects of corruption on public welfare. Corruption renders governments unable or unwilling to maximize welfare. In the first case, it distorts agents' decisions and limits the contractual space available to agents and the government, acting as a benevolent principal. In the second case, a corrupt principal creates allocative inefficiencies, cripples its credible commitment to effective policies, and opens the door to opportunism.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege) |cGöttingenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|acege Discussion Papers |x9en
dc.subject.jelD61en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelK4en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordwelfareen
dc.subject.keywordprincipal-agent-theoryen
dc.subject.keywordrent-seekingen
dc.subject.keywordx-inefficiencyen
dc.subject.keywordkleptocracyen
dc.subject.keywordopportunismen
dc.titleHow corruption in government affects public welfare: A review of theory-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn500238685en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cegedp:9en

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