Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31958
Authors: 
Gubaydullina, Zulia
Bizer, Kilian
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge aus dem Volkswirtschaftlichen Seminar der Universität Göttingen 135
Abstract: 
The paper aims at defining the role of intentions for reciprocity. The ultimatum game is modified, by adding a kind of randomizer (Chinese Whisper), to generate outcomes which are not intended und thus to separate the proposers' initial intentions from their actual offers. The mechanism ensures that the responder reacts to changing intentions and not to changing outcomes. This experimental approach also has the advantage that the number of available options for the proposer is not limited. Our evidence supports the view that fairness theory should explicitly address intentions responders exhibit different acceptance rates depending on the intentions of proposers.
Subjects: 
Fairness
Reciprocity
Intention
Ultimatum game
JEL: 
C72
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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