Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31403 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 07-3
Verlag: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We use our unawareness belief structure to show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade in all states. Yet, we prove a generalized No-trade theorem according to which there can not be common certainty of strict preference to trade. Moreover, we show a generalization of the No-agreeing-to-disagree theorem.
Schlagwörter: 
unawareness
awareness
type-space
Bayesian games
incomplete information
equilibrium
common prior
agreement
speculative trade
interactive epistemology
JEL: 
C70
C72
D80
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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