Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31298
Authors: 
Neyman, Abraham
Okada, Daijiro
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working papers // Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2005,14
Abstract: 
This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects equilibrium outcomes of repeated games, and, as a special case, we study the repeated games with nonstationary bounded recall.
Subjects: 
Bounded Rationality
Strategy Set Growth
Strategic Complexity
Nonstationary Bounded Recall
Repeated Games
Entropy
JEL: 
C72
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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