Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31230 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1406
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
In games with costly signaling, some equilibria are vulnerable to deviations which could be unambiguously interpreted as coming from a unique set of Sender-types. This occurs when these types are precisely the ones who gain from deviating for any beliefs the Re-ceiver could form over that set. We show that this idea characterizes a unique equilibrium outcome in two classes of games. First, in mono-tonic signaling games, only the Riley outcome is immune to this sort of deviation. Our result therefore provides a plausible story behind the selection made by Cho and Kreps' (1987) D1 criterion on this class of games. Second, we examine a version of Crawford and Sobel's (1982) model with costly signaling, where standard refinements have no effect. We show that only a Riley-like separating equilibrium is immune to these deviations.
Schlagwörter: 
Signaling games
Sender-Receiver
robust equilibrium
refinements.
JEL: 
C70
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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