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dc.contributor.authorEső, Péteren
dc.contributor.authorSzentes, Balázsen
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:18:35Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:18:35Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31199-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a model of consulting (advising) where the role of the consultant is that she can reveal signals to her client which refine the client’s original private estimate of the profitability of a project. Importantly, only the client can observe or evaluate these signals, the consultant cannot. We characterize the optimal contract between the consultant and her client. It is a menu consisting of pairs of transfers specifying payments between the two parties (from the client to the consultant or vice versa) in case the project is undertaken by the client and in case it is not. The main result of the paper is that in the optimal mechanism, the consultant obtains the same profit as if she could evaluate the impact of the signals (whose release she controls) on the client’s profit estimate.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1416en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD49en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordMechanism designen
dc.subject.keywordinformation disclosureen
dc.subject.keywordconsultingen
dc.subject.keywordadvisingen
dc.subject.stwSachverständigeen
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe price of advice-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn58746240Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1416en

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