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dc.contributor.authorVrijburg, Hendriken
dc.contributor.authorDe Mooij, Ruud A.en
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-09-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:26:41Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:26:41Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30742-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes enhanced cooperation agreements in corporate taxation in a three country tax competition model where countries differ in size. We characterize equilibrium tax rates and the optimal tax responses due to the formation of an enhanced cooperation agreement. Conditions for strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability of tax rates are crucial for the welfare effects of enhanced cooperation. Simulations show that enhanced cooperation is unlikely to be feasible for small countries. When enhanced cooperation is feasible, it may hamper global harmonization. Only when countries are of similar size is global harmonization a feasible outcome.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2915en
dc.subject.jelE62en
dc.subject.jelF21en
dc.subject.jelH25en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtax coordinationen
dc.subject.keywordasymmetryen
dc.subject.keywordenhanced cooperation agreementsen
dc.subject.keywordstrategic tax responseen
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensbesteuerungen
dc.subject.stwSteuerharmonisierungen
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwMehr-Länder-Modellen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleEnhanced cooperation in an asymmetric model of tax competition-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn618099883en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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