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dc.contributor.authorFunk, Patriciaen
dc.contributor.authorGathmann, Christinaen
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-08-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:26:33Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:26:33Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30729-
dc.description.abstractUsing a new data set on Swiss state and local governments from 1890 to today, we analyze how the adoption of proportional representation affects fiscal policy. We show that proportional systems shift spending toward broad goods (e.g. education and welfare benefits) but decrease spending on targetable goods (e.g. roads and agricultural subsidies). Our evidence does not suggest that proportional representation increases the overall size of government. We provide new evidence on the mechanism behind these estimates. We show that proportional elections lead to better political representation of left-wing parties, which are associated with more spending. Furthermore, proportional elections lead to higher political fragmentation. However, since political fragmentation increases spending in a plurality system only, proportional elections reduce spending through its more moderate effects of fractionalized parliaments.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2958en
dc.subject.jelH00en
dc.subject.jelH10en
dc.subject.jelH40en
dc.subject.jelH52en
dc.subject.jelH53en
dc.subject.jelH72en
dc.subject.jelN83en
dc.subject.jelN84en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordelectoral systemen
dc.subject.keywordpublic financeen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical fragmentationen
dc.subject.keywordmatchingen
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken
dc.subject.stwTeilstaaten
dc.subject.stwGemeindefinanzenen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwWahlsystemen
dc.subject.stwSchweizen
dc.titleHow do electoral systems affect fiscal policy? Evidence from state and local governments, 1890 to 2005-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn620441178en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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