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dc.contributor.authorWagener, Andreasen
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-01-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:20:35Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:20:35Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30523-
dc.description.abstractRather than about absolute payoffs, governments in fiscal competition often seem to care about their performance relative to other governments. Moreover, they often appear to mimic policies observed elsewhere. We study such behaviour in a tax competition game with mobile capital à la Zodrow-Mieszkowski. Both with relative payoff concerns and for imitative policies, evolutionary stability is the appropriate solution concept. It renders tax competition more aggressive than with best-reply policies (Nash equilibrium). Whatever the number of jurisdictions involved, an evolutionary stable tax policy coincides with the competitive outcome of a tax competition game played among infinitely many governments. Tax competition among boundedly rational governments, thus, involves drastic efficiency losses.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2723en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.jelH75en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordfiscal competitionen
dc.subject.keywordrelative performanceen
dc.subject.keywordtax mimickingen
dc.subject.keywordevolutionary stabilityen
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben
dc.subject.stwImitationswettbewerben
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Rationalitäten
dc.subject.stwEvolutionäre Spieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleTax competition, relative performance and policy imitation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn607959622en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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