Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30187 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper No. 2010-04
Verlag: 
Kiel University, Department of Economics, Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
The aim of this paper is to solve the inconsistency problem à la Barro and Gordon within a New Keynesian model and to derive time-consistent (stable) interest rate rules of Taylor-type. We find a multiplicity of stable rules. In contrast to the Kydland/Prescott-Barro/Gordon approach, implementing a monetary rule where the cost and benefit resulting from inconsistent policy coincide - which implies a net gain of inconsistent policy behavior equal to zero - is not optimal. Instead, the solution can be improved by moving into the time-consistent area where the net gain of inconsistent policy is negative. We moreover show that under a standard calibration, the standard Taylor rule is stable in the case of a cost-push shock as well as under simultaneous supply and demand shocks.
Schlagwörter: 
Optimal monetary policy
New Keynesian macroeconomics
Reputational equilibria
time-consistent simple rules
JEL: 
A20
E52
E58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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