Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30129 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 2009,15
Verlag: 
Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Marburg
Zusammenfassung: 
When enacting labor market regulation governments face courts that interpret and implement the legal code. We show that the incentives for governments for labor market reform increase with the uncertainty that is involved in the implementation of legal codes through courts. Given that judges have more discretion in common as opposed to civil law systems more reform activity as a response to crises should be observed in the former system. This finding is backed by evidence from a panel of OECD countries.
Schlagwörter: 
labor market regulation
labor courts
uncertainty
unemployment
JEL: 
D78
K31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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